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MICHAEL C. DORF
AND BARRY FRIEDMAN

SHARED CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION

1
In United States v Dickerson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Mi-

randa v Arizona,' stating that it was "a constitutional decision," and
3
thus not subject to congressional overruling. A contrary judgment

would have had enormous symbolic significance, as Mirandais one
of the best-known legacies of the Warren Court. In penning the

opinion for a seven-two majority in Dickerson, Chief Justice Rehnquist reassured the legal community and the nation at large that
Court's criminal procedure revolution
this pillar of the Warren
4
would remain standing.
Michael C. Dorf is Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. Barry Friedman is Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
AUTHORS' NOTE: We gratefully acknowledge the very useful comments and suggestions
of Sherry Colb, Samuel Issacharoff, Yale Kamisar, Larry Kramer, Debra Livingston, Henry
Monaghan, Gerald Neuman, Robert Post, George Thomas, and Richard Uviller. Research
assistance was ably provided by Scott Chesin, Jason Cooper, and Jeremy Saks. Special thanks
go to Lisa Mihajlovic and Geoffrey Stone.
'120 S Ct 2326 (2000).
2 384 US 436 (1966).
3 United States v Dickerson, 120 S Ct 2326, 2329 (2000).
4 This is not to say that current criminal procedure doctrine is in any way a straightforward extension of the rest of the Warren Court's views. Although cases like Miranda and
Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961), have not been overruled, the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have undermined Warren Court legal doctrines through, inter alia, a variety of rules
that reduce or eliminate the penalty that law enforcement must pay for violating suspects'
or defendants' rights. See Carol Steiker, Counter-Revolution in ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich L Rev 2466, 2469 (1996) ("The edifice constructed by the Warren Court governing investigative techniques . . . remains surprisingly
intact. Rather than redrawing in any drastic fashion the line between constitutional and
unconstitutional police conduct, the Supreme Court has revolutionized the consequences
of deeming conduct unconstitutional.")
© 2001 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0-226-36249-3/2001/2000-0001$02.00
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Most of the legal community saw Dickerson as an important case
about criminal procedure, but the decision's far greater significance may lie in its implications for the shared institutional process
of determining constitutional meaning. Even as it prescribed the
now-familiar warnings that must precede custodial interrogation,
the Miranda Court abjured any intention to subject law enforcement to a "constitutional straightjacket,"' and thus invited "Congress and the States to ... search for ... other procedures which
are at least as effective [as the Court-prescribed warnings] in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a
continuous opportunity to exercise it."6 On its face the Dickerson
opinion appears a strong statement of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, but the Dickerson Court nonetheless reiterated Miranda's "invitation" to other constitutional actors to fashion equally effective safeguards for Fifth Amendment rights.7
Dickerson thus invites examination of the following question:
What role might nonjudicial institutions and officials play in determining the meaning of the Constitution? Suppose that Congress or the states were to accept the invitation to devise alternatives to the warnings prescribed by the Court. Is the Supreme
Court prepared to entertain such alternatives, and thus permit others to share in the task of interpreting the Constitution? And how
should the Miranda Court's invitation to Congress and the states
be understood in the light of recent decisions narrowing federal
power in favor of state sovereignty?
Dickerson and the somewhat bewildering array of recent federalism decisions provide an appropriate opportunity to explore the
relative roles of the Court, Congress, and the states in matters of
constitutional interpretation. Although the Court of late has displayed a self-aggrandizing tendency, we believe there nonetheless
is, within existing doctrine, substantial room for institutional dialogue about the meaning of the Constitution.8 We explore that
constitutional space and how it might be employed as a model
'Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 467 (1966).
6
Id.
'Dickerson, 120 S Ct at 2334.
' See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich L Rev 577 (1993) (envisioning creation of constitutional meaning as a dialogic process).
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of shared constitutional interpretation. We emphasize two themes
throughout: first, there is, and ought to be, considerable opportunity for shared constitutional interpretation; and second, this cooperative process can work only if all constitutional actors are sufficiently humble about their own conclusions and respectful of the
pronouncements of the others.
We begin, necessarily, with the question of precisely what Miranda and Dickerson held. We say "necessarily" because it is apparent from Dickerson and other recent Supreme Court decisions that
the Court will not tolerate tampering by other actors with what
the Court views as constitutional bedrock. As the Dickerson Court
said, ". . . Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions
interpreting and applying the Constitution." 9 The important question after Dickerson-and in any case in which other constitutional
actors seek to share with the Court the job of defining the scope
1
of the Constitution-is where the freedom of action lies. "
Our concern here is not whether Mirandawas correct as an original matter.11 For all the ambiguity Dickerson leaves, it makes clear
that Miranda is here to stay. With that starting point, we ask how
Miranda and Dickerson are best understood. In our view, these cases
stand for the proposition that suspects have a constitutional right
to some procedures that are adequate to inform them of the right
to remain silent in the face of custodial interrogation, and a consti120 S Ct at 2332 (citing City of Boerne v Flores, 521 US 507 (1997)).
l0Of late, there has been a veritable flood of commentary disparaging judicial supremacy
and urging that greater attention be paid to the role of nonjudicial actors in constitutional
interpretation. For a representative sampling, see Akhil Reed Amar and Alan Hirsch, For
the People: What the Constitution Really Says About Your Rights (1998); Louis Fisher and Neal
Devins, Political Dynamics of ConstitutionalLaw (2d ed. 1996); Richard Parker, "Here, the
People Rule": A ConstitutionalPopulist Manifesto (1994); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution
Away from the Courts (1999). Although we have some sympathy for the notion of shared
constitutional interpretation, see Michael C. Dorf, Supreme Court 1997 Term, Foreword: The
Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv L Rev 4, 60-73 (1998) (advocating "provisional
adjudication" that expressly authorizes experimentation); Friedman, 91 Mich L Rev at 580
(cited in note 8) ("the everyday process of constitutional interpretation integrates all three
branches of government"), we think some of this work sweeps too far in denying the Court's
supremacy with regard to constitutional interpretation.
'" See Albert W. Alschuler, A PeculiarPrivilege in HistoricalPerspective: The Right to Remain
Silent, 94 Mich L Rev 2625 (1996) (arguing against a right to silence on normative and
historical grounds); Akhil Reed Amar and Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment FirstPrinciples:
The Self-IncriminationClause, 93 Mich L Rev 857 (1995) (same); R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence
as a Moral and ConstitutionalRight, 23 Wm & Mary L Rev 15 (1981) (arguing for a right
to silence only in the face of interrogation on slight suspicion).

HeinOnline -- 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 62 20002

64

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2000

tutional right to procedures that provide a continuous opportunity
to exercise the right to remain silent.12 The four particular warnings set forth in Miranda are not constitutionally required "in the
sense that nothing else will suffice to satisfy constitutional requirements." 3 Equally effective procedures could be substituted for the
warnings. However, Dickerson and Miranda hold that the Fifth
Amendment requires some safeguard that is at least as effective.
The federal statute at issue in Dickerson, 18 USC § 3501, did not
satisfy that requirement because it essentially restored the status
quo prior to Miranda. That is the basic, and basically sound, rationale of Dickerson.
This understanding of Dickerson as constitutional interpretation
makes it possible to sidestep most of the academic debate about
whether the Court has the authority to promulgate "prophylactic
rules" or "constitutional common law" 4-doctrines that are not
required by the Constitution but crafted by the Court to protect
underlying or core constitutional requirements.15 It is possible to
12Implicit in the right to be informed of a right to silence, of course, is a right to silence
itself. That right appeared to receive explicit protection a year before Miranda in Griffin
v California, 380 US 609 (1965) (prohibiting an inference of guilt from a suspect's silence
in the face of police questioning). Some post-Miranda cases appear to be inconsistent with
a Fifth Amendment right to silence. See Baxter v Palmigiano, 425 US 308, 316-20 (1976)
(in prison disciplinary proceeding, permitting adverse inference from silence); Fletcher v
Weir, 455 US 603 (1982) (in criminal trial, permitting admission of post-arrest silence for
impeachment purposes). These cases can probably be reconciled with Miranda, however.
Baxter reflects the Court's general unwillingness to apply the Fifth Amendment to civil
proceedings, while Fletcher's problems, whatever they may be, are of a piece with Harris v
New York, 401 US 222 (1970), discussed below. See Part I.C.
13Dickerson, 120 S Ct at 2335.
14Compare Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 Harv L Rev 1 (1975) (explaining how the Court might legitimately be
seen to have the power to make law beyond what the Constitution requires); Martha A.
Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 Harv L Rev 883 (1986) (less
tentatively, same); Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement
Oficials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 Colum L Rev 247, 28795 (1988) (same, also less tentatively); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,
55 U Chi L Rev 190 (1988) (same, taking prophylaxis as paradigm rather than exception)
with Joseph D. Grano, ProphylacticRules in CriminalProcedure:A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw U L Rev 100 (1985) (challenging the legitimacy of most common law and
prophylaxis).
11A typical example is David Huitema, Miranda:Legitimate Response to ContingentRequirements of the Fifth Amendment, 18 Yale L & Policy Rev 261 (2000). In Huitema's view, the
Fifth Amendment touchstone is voluntariness, but the Mirandarule is nonetheless a justified
prophylactic measure because courts cannot accurately distinguish voluntary from involuntary confessions. See id at 269-70. See also Lawrence Crocker, Can the Exclusionary Rule
Be Saved? 84 J Crim L & Criminol 310, 312 (1993);John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan L Rev 1027, 1029-30, 1055 (1974).
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see why the academy and the Court both tried to understand Miranda in these subconstitutional terms, but the case can be explained equally effectively without raising the legitimacy concerns
that prophylaxis and constitutional common law trigger: Miranda
can be justified purely in terms of the Court's incontestable power
to interpret the Constitution. Adequate safeguards for the right
to remain silent during custodial interrogation are constitutionally
required.
Hence, two principles frame the balance of this article as well
as the process of shared constitutional interpretation. On the one
hand, Mirandais a constitutional decision, and the Court has made
clear repeatedly that neither Congress nor state officials can defy
or repeal a judicial decision construing the Constitution.16 On the
other hand, Miranda and Dickerson both explicitly invited Congress
and the states to take action in response to those decisions. What
is it we can learn about the process of cooperative interpretation
from this invitation?
After tracing the tortured doctrinal path from Miranda to Dickerson, Part I poses this question by offering a hypothetical congressional response to the "invitation." Suppose Congress were to pass
a statute governing all custodial interrogation by federal agents.
The statute, which we dub the "Anti-Coercion and Effective Custodial Interrogation Act" ("ACECIA"), provides that: before custodial interrogation by federal authorities commences, the suspect
must be informed of his right to remain silent; prior to the institution of adversarial proceedings, a suspect has no right to have an
attorney present during federal custodial interrogation; all federal
custodial interrogation must be videotaped; and no statement that
results from federal custodial interrogation is admissible in a federal criminal trial unless the interrogation was videotaped and the
statement was voluntary.
Although ACECIA departs substantially from the scheme set
forth in Miranda, it is plausibly an alternative procedure that both
informs the suspect of his right to remain silent and, through the
videotaping requirement, ensures a continuous opportunity to exercise it. Part I uses this example to explore the questions of who
6 See Boerne, 521 US at 516-29 (1997) (equating the Constitution's meaning with the
Court's doctrine); Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he federal judiciary is supreme
in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.").
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decides whether an alternative procedure is as effective as the default set by Miranda and according to what criteria. We conclude
that there may be more than one way to safeguard constitutional
rights, that if Congress wishes to be heard in this dialogue it must
act sensibly in drafting alternatives, and that the Court ought then
to consider such alternatives respectfully. The debate over the
meaning of Miranda and the constitutionality of Section 3501 has
not reflected mutual respect, but we can envision a dialogue about
protecting Fifth Amendment rights that does.
Part II turns from the relative powers of Court and Congress
to those of Congress and the states. Here we imagine that Congress goes further, affirmatively requiring the states to employ its
favored safeguard, videotaping. Would such a "National AntiCoercion Act" ("NACA") be valid against the claim of a state that
wished to adhere to the original Miranda warnings? Part II asks
where Congress derives the authority to impose such an obligation
on the states. The answer, we conclude, is Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. After the recent decisions narrowly construing
Section 5,17 adding constitutional safeguards at the Court's express
invitation would seem one of the few valid uses of that congressional power. We next use a variant of ACECIA and NACA (with
yet another acronym) to clarify the sense in which Section 5 acts
as a one-way ratchet.
Assuming that Congress has the affirmative power to impose a
videotaping requirement on the states, we ask the further question
whether doing so would violate the anticommandeering principle
of New York v United States8 and Printz v United States.1 9 Perhaps,
pursuant to Reno v Condon,2" the videotaping requirement could be
understood as preemptive regulation rather than as an affirmative
command. But even if not, we conclude on Supremacy Clause
grounds that if the obligation were phrased simply as a rule of substantive law applicable in state court, it would not violate the anticommandeering principle.
" See United States v Morrison, 120 S Ct 1740, 1755-59 (2000); Kimel v Florida Bd. of
Regents, 120 S Ct 631, 644-50 (2000); FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd. v College
Savings Bank, 527 US 627, 636-47 (1999); Boerne, 521 US at 516-36 (1997).
18505 US 144 (1992).
19521 US 898 (1997).
120 S Ct 666 (2000).

20
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Despite the power of Congress to impose rules of this nature
on the states, Congress should hesitate to do so, for the same sort
of reasons that the Court should take seriously congressional attempts to define "equally effective" constitutional safeguards. The
whole point of the no-straightjacket language from Miranda is to
encourage experimentation by a variety of jurisdictions. By imposing a uniform national rule, NACA would defeat the purpose of
recognizing a zone of experimentation. Just as the Supreme Court
ought to be respectful of procedures besides the ones it has devised
for guaranteeing rights, Congress should hesitate to exercise its
Section 5 power where doing so stifles state and local innovation.
Finally, suppose that a state were to pass its own ACECIA applicable to state actors. If the federal ACECIA is valid, as we suggest
in Part I, is this valid as well? Part III concludes that because the
key to upholding any set of procedures for safeguarding the right
to remain silent is the conclusion that those safeguards are adequate, and not who envisioned or enforced those safeguards, then
just as Congress may devise safeguards equal or superior to those
devised by the Court, so can the states. But here too we return
to the point about respect and humility. Rather than taking up
Miranda's "invitation," most state officials did nothing, or attacked
Miranda as outside the Court's power. The Supreme Court of late
has created a very different environment for federalism as a laboratory for experimentation. Whether that experiment will succeed
depends not so much upon the Court, but upon whether the states
eschew the use of their autonomy to curtail individual rights (as has
too often been the case in the past) and become serious partners in
the process of governance and constitutional interpretation.
Ultimately this article is about shared constitutional experimentation, and the institutional humility and respect necessary to foster it. Because constitutional meaning is so wrapped up in broader
questions of governance, constitutional interpretation should be a
shared endeavor among (at the least) all the branches of the national, state, and local governments. Each branch brings to the
process both a constitutional role and a set of institutional advantages (and vantages). For the process to work, however, each actor
must display humility and treat the pronouncements of other actors respectfully, granting them the weight they deserve. The response to the Miranda invitation demonstrates this process at its
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worst; the response to the Dickerson invitation that we envision
here suggests a better alternative.
I.

THE CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT,

AND EVERYONE ELSE

In 1966, in Miranda v Arizona, the Supreme Court held
that a criminal defendant's confession cannot be admitted in evidence unless interrogating officers follow certain procedures, including providing the suspect with the now-familiar Miranda
warnings. In the years following, the Miranda decision was criticized continually,2 1 and its survival often appeared in doubt. United
States v Dickerson reaffirmed Miranda, putting to rest, at least for
the foreseeable future, the fate of this constitutional landmark.
Yet matters are not as simple as they seem, for Dickerson leaves
us no more certain than did Miranda about precisely what the
Constitution requires regarding a suspect's rights during police interrogation. Moreover, Dickerson does nothing to eliminate the
confusion created by Miranda's invitation to other political actors
to develop an alternative to the Miranda regime.
At issue in Dickerson was the constitutionality of Section 3501,
a congressional statute enacted to replace Miranda. Section 3501
essentially imposed the "voluntariness" test as the sole standard
for evaluating the constitutionality of confessions, while making
the failure to provide warnings one factor in the determination
whether, in any given case, a confession was unlawfully compelled.22 Dickerson invalidated Section 3501, but at the same time
21See note 31.

2218 USC § 3501 provides:

Admissibility of confessions
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District
of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible
in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence,
the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to
voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily
made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to
hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury
to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the
circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant
making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2)
whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged
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restated Miranda's invitation to other political actors to provide a
meaningful alternative to the Miranda regime.23
After Dickerson, confusion lingers over what it means to say that
Miranda formulated a "constitutional rule," and what freedom that
statement leaves other constitutional officials in responding to the
decision. The Court in Dickerson repeatedly invoked the idea of a
constitutional rule in explaining why Congress could not overturn
Miranda'srequirements. But if Miranda is a constitutional rule, and
if Congress cannot overturn constitutional rules, then what does
the Miranda/Dickerson"invitation" invite Congress and the states
to do?
Ambiguity about the foundation of Miranda provided the basis
upon which Justice Scalia's biting dissent took the Dickerson Court
to task. The Supreme Court only has the power to decide cases
24
based on the Constitution, Justice Scalia explained. But Miranda's
many progeny (and the many Justices who wrote those decisions)
or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether
or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any
statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or
not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance
of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession. The presence or
absence of any of the above mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by
the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein, while
such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any law enforcement officer or law enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible solely because
of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate [magistrate judge] or other
officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of
the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is found by
the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the
confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such
person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any
case in which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate or other
officer beyond such six hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable
considering the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the
nearest available such magistrate or other officer.
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in evidence of any
confession made or given voluntarily by any person to any other person without
interrogation by anyone, or at any time at which the person who made or gave
such confession was not under arrest or other detention.
(e) As used in this section, the term "confession" means any confession of guilt
of any criminal offense or any selfincriminating statement made or given orally
or in writing.
3 See Dickerson, 120 S Ct at 2334.
24See id at 2338 (Scalia dissenting).
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expressly denied the constitutional status of Miranda. If Miranda
is constitutionally grounded, Justice Scalia insisted, then the many
intervening decisions cannot be justified. If Miranda is not constitutionally compelled, then the Court should have upheld Section
3501 because it clearly complied with the core Fifth Amendment
command that confessions not be "compelled." As Justice Scalia
25
saw it, one or the other must be true.
As we explain, we believe Miranda can be understood as a constitutional decision. Thus Justice Scalia is wrong in seeing the situation in binary terms. Justice Scalia would put the Court to a stark
choice: overrule its intervening decisions or uphold Section 3501.
But as we will make clear, Section 3501's unconstitutionality does
not necessarily doom the Court's entire Miranda jurisprudence.
Where Justice Scalia is on firm ground, however, is in criticizing
the Court's frequent resort to ipse dixit. Miranda and its progeny
reveal two sides of the modern Court. On the one hand, Dickerson
is a relatively small step in the Court's recent insistence on judicial
hegemony with regard to constitutional interpretation. 26 On the
other hand, Miranda's progeny reveal a result-oriented Court that
has too little care for the coherence of its own jurisprudence. Unfortunately, Dickerson continues this trend.
Dickerson was a devil of the Court's own doing. Miranda was not
an altogether popular decision, but it was a constitutional one, and
cultural respect for the Constitution and the Court led to general
adherence to the rule. The Justices themselves undermined the
rule, in part by their eagerness to slice pieces off whenever possible, but worse by saying peculiar things like, "these procedural
safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution ' 27 and "the rule . . . is our rule, not a constitutional command. ' 28 As we explain below, Miranda is best understood as guaranteeing adequate procedural safeguards rather than any particular
set of safeguards, but that is a far more modest principle than the
one the Court espoused in some post-Miranda cases: that nothing
21 See id at 2342.
26 See Boerne, 521 US at 516-29 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44

(1996). See generally Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond Marbury:JurisdictionalSelf-Dealing in Semi-

nole Tribe, 52 Vand L Rev 407, 408-09 (1999) (noting the Court's preference for its own
power and disdain for Congress).

'"Michiganv Tucker, 417 US 433, 444 (1974).
"5Arizona v Roberson, 486 US 675, 688 (1988) (Kennedy dissenting).

HeinOnline -- 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 69 20002

SHARED CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

71

Miranda required flowed from the Constitution itself. The Court
took the tack it did because prevailing in individual cases assumed
greater importance to some, sometimes a majority, of the Justices
than maintaining its institutional role. And in doing so the Court
diminished respect for its own decisions.29

A.

THE PUZZLE OF MIRANDA

As many have observed, Miranda reads more like a legislative
edict than a judicial decision.3" It begins by announcing a statutelike holding, then supports and fleshes it out in a committee
report-like opinion. The decision was vilified instantly,3 1 and yet
the Miranda warnings today are household words, appearing frequently in the popular media. The Court in Dickerson is right that
Miranda is embedded in our culture.
But what is Miranda, and what did it hold? These questions
hardly were posed by Section 3501's frontal attack on the rule.
Prior to Miranda the constitutional test for a confession was
whether it was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.
In enacting Section 3501, Congress seized on Miranda's statement
that the decision was not a "constitutional straightjacket" and that
it would govern only in the absence of alternatives. However, Con-

" One particularly troubling manifestation of this disrespect is the practice of police officers questioning suspects "outside Miranda." In this practice, police officers intentionally
ignore Miranda, knowing that any statement obtained can be used for impeachment purposes pursuant to Harris v New York, 401 US 222, 225 (1971), or for other purposes consistent with the Mirandaexceptions the Court has fashioned. See Transcript of Deputy District
Attorney Devallis Rutledge, in Videotape: Questioning "Outside Miranda" (Greg Gulen Productions 1990), excerpted in Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L Rev
109 at 189-92 (1998). There is simply no way to interpret Miranda as a decision permitting
such questioning. To do so makes a mockery of the constitutional right at stake, but the
Court's own treatment of Miranda has encouraged this sort of behavior. In addition to its
general denigrations of Miranda, in Oregon v Hass, 420 US 714 (1975), the Court thought
that questioning outside Miranda was a mere "speculative possibility." Id at 723. Even if
that were true in 1975, it no longer is. See Richard A. Leo and Welsh S. White, Adapting
to Miranda: Modern Interrogators' Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda,
84 Minn L Rev 397, 460 (1999) (noting that "[a]t least two state courts have held that
even statements obtained after an interrogator's deliberate misrepresentation as to the admissibility of the suspect's statement may be introduced for the purpose of impeachment,"
although one state court has ruled such statements inadmissible as a due process violation).
0Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal L Rev 672, 678 (1992).
31 For an instructive description, see Otis H. Stephens, Jr., The Supreme Court and Confessions of Guilt 165 (1973). See generally Fred P. Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound 245 (1970).

HeinOnline -- 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 70 20002

72

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2000

gress simply returned to the original constitutional rule, and added
32
the Miranda warnings as factors in determining voluntariness.
Thus, Dickerson was an easy case, because no matter what Miranda held, Section 3501 seemed to flout it. Miranda emphasized
the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, and clearly
stated that any alternative had to be "equally effective" in ameliorating this compulsion and safeguarding a suspect's rights. Section
3501 provided no alternative, equally effective or otherwise. It was
a slap at the Court,3 3 and if any Court was likely to slap back, it
was this one. For the Court that in recent years has given us Seminole Tribe of Floridav Florida,3 4 Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,35 City
of Boerne v Flores,36 and other decisions favoring its own power at
the expense of Congress, Section 3501 was a gnat that ran into
the windshield of whatever it was that Miranda held.
Yet Miranda'sholding is elusive, and time has made it only more
so. Some of the numerous post-Miranda decisions arguably have
expanded upon Miranda's safeguards, such as the rule in Edwards
v Arizona37 that once a suspect requests counsel, the police may
not initiate any further questioning, even with regard to another
offense.38 But many more decisions have cut back on what might
have seemed the constitutional core of Miranda. Michigan v
Tucker 39 and Oregon v Elstad4 held that the "fruits" of Miranda
violations did not have to be excluded from evidence,4 1 Harris v
New York 42 held that statements taken in violation of Miranda

" See Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda? 85 Cornell L Rev 883,
passim (2000).
31See id at 895.
34517 US 44 (1996) (holding that the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress
power to abrogate state's sovereign immunity).
35514 US 211 (1995) (broadly construing the principle that Congress cannot retroactively
change the law applicable to a litigated case).
36521 US 507 (1997) (holding that Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is strictly remedial and preventative).
37451 US 477 (1981).
31See id at 484-85.
39417 US 433 (1974).

-470 US 298 (1985).
" See id at 308; Tucker, 417 US at 450.
42401 US 222 (1971).
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could be used for impeachment purposes, 43 New York v Quarles44
held that voluntary responses to interrogation without warnings
were admissible if the interrogation was necessary to protect the
public safety, 45 and so on.
What further complicated the meaning of Miranda was the
Court's own constant rhetorical undermining of the decision. The
Court consistently denied the constitutional basis of Miranda.Miranda came to be understood, in the Court's own words, as a "prophylactic. ' 46 The Constitution prohibited compelling statements
from an accused, and admission of compelled statements would
violate the core constitutional requirement, but in order to safeguard that right, the Court had adopted these broader rules. A
violation of the particular rules themselves barred use of a statement so obtained, but only to the extent required by the Court's
decisions. And for the most part, that area of limitation shrank
over time.
B. THE "PROPHYLAXIS"

APPROACH

The Court's post-Miranda decisions, and parallel developments
with regard to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, under-47
standably led to exploration of the idea of a prophylactic rule.
3See id at 226.
4467 US 649 (1984).
"5 See id at 655.
See Duckworth v Eagan, 492 US 195, 203 (1989); Connecticut v Barrett, 479 US 523,
528 (1987); Oregon v Elstad, 470 US 298, 305 (1985); New York v Quarles, 467 US 649,
654 (1984).
47Most of the academic literature accepts the legitimacy of prophylaxis, with the debate
focusing on how to justify it. See, e.g., Strauss, 550 Chi L Rev at 195 (cited in note 14)
(equating prophylaxis with ordinary constitutional interpretation); Brian K. Landsberg,
Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 Tenn L Rev
925, 949-63 (1999) (offering different justifications for different forms of prophylaxis);
Monaghan, 89 Harv L Rev at 21 (cited in note 14) (viewing prophylaxis as a form of federal
common law); Kamisar, 85 Cornell L Rev at 943 (cited in note 32) (accepting, arguendo,
Monaghan's view, but distinguishing those aspects of Miranda that are constitutionally required); Huitema, 18 Yale L & Policy Rev at 265 (cited in note 15) (justifying prophylaxis
addressed to risks of constitutional violations and activities that chill the exercise of constitutional rights). But see Grano, 80 Nw U L Rev 100 (cited in note 14) (rejecting the legitimacy
of most prophylaxis); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda'sConstitutionalDifficulties:A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U Chi L Rev 174 (1988) (same).
Some commentators also distinguish between prophylactic rules and per se rules. See
Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, and Nancy King, CriminalProcedure §§ 2.9(d), 2.9(e)
(2d ed 1999); Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDetermination, 40 U Cin
L Rev 199, 250-52 (1971).
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For more than thirty years, the Court imposed Miranda on the
states, but denied that it was a constitutional command. Similarly
with regard to the Fourth Amendment, the Court frequently has
denied that the exclusionary rule was compelled by the Constitution, giving it power to taper the remedy as it wished.48 Yet, the
remedies could not coherently be explained as an exercise of the
Court's supervisory power over the federal courts because they applied to the states, despite their assertedly nonconstitutional nature. The Court's own explanation for this apparent anomaly was
the notion of prophylactic rules. Miranda and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary principle were not constitutional commands,
but prophylactic safeguards.
The first and perhaps still best attempt to understand the jurisprudence of prophylaxis was Henry Monaghan's Harvard Law Review foreword, "Constitutional Common Law. ' 49 Monaghan's
central point was that much of what appears to be the Supreme
Court's constitutional jurisprudence "is best understood as something of a quite different order-a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority
from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions." 5 In
Monaghan's view, Miranda could be justified on utilitarian grounds
as just this sort of constitutional common law. But key to Monaghan's entire understanding was that because these rules were not
themselves constitutionally required, they were "subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress.""1 In that light,
Monaghan would have granted Congress wide (but not unlimited)
authority over the contours of Miranda.
The subsequent scholarly literature of prophylaxis typically
makes one of two common "moves." One, typified by David
41See United States v Calandra,414 US 338, 348 (1974) (holding the exclusionary rule
inapplicable to grand jury proceedings because it is "a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than
a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."); Stone v Powell, 428 US 465 (1976)
(for the same reason holding that habeas corpus relief is unavailable where state prisoner
alleges that evidence was admitted in violation of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule);
United States v Leon, 468 US 897 (1984) (for the same reason permitting admission of
evidence obtained in good faith reliance on a defective warrant).
4 See Monaghan, 89 Harv L Rev 1 (cited in note 14).
5
oId at 2.
s'Id at 3.
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Strauss's "The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules," 5 2 argues that the
structure of the Miranda rule is not so different from many other
areas of constitutional law because constitutional decisions frequently go beyond the core constitutional command.53 The point
of Strauss's move essentially is to normalize Miranda. He thus
equates it, for example, with the Court's strict treatment of content regulation under the First Amendment, which Strauss understands as regulating beyond the bounds of what the amendment
literally requires to avoid government violation of free speech guar54
antees.
A competing move subjects the idea of a prophylactic rule to
harsh analysis, carving out a small realm where such prophylaxis
might be acceptable, but for the most part deeming it illegitimate.
Typical is Joseph Grano's "Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy. ' 55 Grano contends that
some rules that have been understood as prophylactic could be
reconceptualized as constitutionally required, either as a matter of
procedural due process 5 6 or some specific constitutional command. 7 This reconceptualization may solve the legitimacy problem in general, but Grano concludes that "any attempt to provide
a constitutional foundation for [Miranda itself] would be strained
58
and ultimately unconvincing."
Although scholarship since the Monaghan article has helped to
clarify the propriety of certain judicial decisions, we think that the
analytic value of the concept of prophylaxis is limited because ultimately it asks the wrong question.5 9 Perhaps we may be accused
of sidestepping an important discussion, but in our view the critical
question is not how to justify judicial rulings that go beyond what

52 See

Strauss, 55 U Chi L Rev 190 (cited in note 14).

11See

generally id.
See id at 197.
s See Grano, 80 Nw U L Rev 100 (cited in note 14).
54

56

See id at 157-62.

5 See id at 162-63.
58

Id at 163.
5 Compare Dorf, 112 Harv L Rev at 72 (cited in note 10) ("reflecting on the large role
of doctrinal prophylaxis [in the Strauss approach] may lead us, by a seeming paradox, to
discard the dichotomy of core versus prophylactic norms.").
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the text and history of the Constitution strictly require. In a postRealist world, there is no shortage of justifications for courts making law. In our view, analysis focuses most usefully on what steps
nonjudicial actors may take in response to judicial decisions, however they are justified. This, incidentally, was the focus of Monaghan's original work. His Foreword was not so much an attempt
to justify constitutional common law as an effort to explore its
mutability. We believe this is the right approach.6 °
C.

A MORE TRADITIONAL SOLUTION: MIRANDA AND ITS PROGENY
AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Miranda can be explained without resort to prophylaxis, 61 as an
exercise of the Court's traditional authority to interpret the Constitution in the course of deciding cases. There are two ways of
understanding Miranda as ordinary constitutional interpretation.
One understanding is that the entire procedure mandated by
Miranda is part of the right embodied in the Fifth Amendment.
Such an interpretation is unassailable from a legitimacy standpoint,
except perhaps among originalists. We do not mean to say that
this necessarily is a correct interpretation of the Constitution. We
mean only that the Court regularly determines what the Constitution means, and it is not helpful to challenge Miranda's legitimacy
by pointing out that the "traditional" rule under the Fifth Amend-

61We would apply the same approach to an often equally bewildering problem, that of
constitutional remedies. Indeed, sometimes it is difficult even to tell whether what is being
discussed is a prophylactic rule or a constitutional remedy. Is exclusion of a confession
based on a Mirandaviolation an application of the prophylactic rule, a remedy for an earlier
violation of the Miranda right, or both? All that is clear is that commentators perceive
similar problems of authority and scope. For a sampling of work on the relationship between
rights and remedies, see William C. Heffernan, Foreword: The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as ConstitutionalRemedy, 88 Geo L J 799 (2000); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel
J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 Harv L Rev 1733
(1991); Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing FederalRemedies, 65 S Cal
L Rev 735 (1992); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
Colum L Rev 857 (1999). For a more comprehensive catalogue, see Friedman, supra, at
736 n.4.
01 We do not address whether other categories of cases now understood in prophylactic
terms could be reconceprualized. See, e.g., Colter v Kentucky, 407 US 104, 116 (1972) (treating as prophylactic the Court's decision in North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711 (1969),
which established a presumption of vindictiveness in cases in which a trial judge imposed
a harsher sentence upon resentencing after a reversal than in the first instance).
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ment was voluntariness.62 Although the traditional rule under the
Sixth Amendment implied no obligation on the state to provide
counsel,63 Betts v Brady64 imposed such an obligation under special
circumstances,6 5 and that rule was in turn superseded by Gideon v
Wainwright.66 Constitutional rules evolve.67 We do not observe
many people claiming that Gideon was illegitimate, which perhaps
suggests some connection between perceived correctness and perceived legitimacy.
There is some support for this understanding of Miranda both
in the decision itself and in subsequent cases. Miranda establishes
two fundamental propositions: first (as had seemed clear since
Brain v United States68 ), the Fifth Amendment applies in the sta2 Thus, Justice White, who dissented in Miranda, nonetheless forcefully defended its
legitimacy in a speech before the chief justices of the state courts. See Justice Byron R.
White, Recent Developments in Criminal Law, Address Before the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices (Aug. 3, 1967), in Council of State Governments,
Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the Conference of Chief Justices (1967), quoted
in Kamisar, 85 Cornell L Rev at 908-09 (cited in note 32).
63The first case in which the Court hinted at any obligation on the state to provide
appointed counsel was Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45 (1932), and even there the defendants'
ignorance, the capital charge, and the potential availability of retained counsel all suggest
an extremely limited right.

-4316 US 455 (1942).
65Id at 473 ("while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking
in . . . fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the [Fourteenth] Amendment embodies an
inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted
and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.").
- 372 US 335 (1963). See also Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25 (1972) (finding a right
to counsel in misdemeanor and petty cases for which the defendant is imprisoned); Scott v
Illinois, 440 US 367 (1979) (finding no right to counsel where state statute authorizes punishment of imprisonment but imprisonment is not imposed); David A. Strauss, Common
Law, Common Ground, andJefferson'sPrinciple (manuscript on file with authors), at 30 (noting
mere coincidence between the language of the Sixth Amendment and the rule of Gideon v
Wainwright, 372 US 335 (1963)).
67A variety of theories exist that seek to legitimize the evolution of constitutional rules,
but no matter what the relative merits of these theories, the fact of evolution is impossible
to deny. For a sampling of the relevant theories, see Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People:
Foundations (1991) (constitutional moments); Michael C. Doff, Integrating Normative and
Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 Geo L J 1765 (1997)
(pragmatic eclecticism); Barry Friedman and Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution,
147 U Pa L Rev 1 (1998) (development through experience over time); Larry Kramer,
Fidelity to History-andThrough It, 65 Fordham L Rev 1627 (1997) (same); Lawrence Lessig,
UnderstandingChanged Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan L Rev 395 (1995) (translation);
David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev 877, 884 (1996)
(common law development).
68168 US 532 (1897).
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tionhouse; and second, custodial interrogation is inherently coercive. In light of these conclusions, Miranda held that something
needs to be done to ensure that police custodial interrogation does
not violate the Fifth Amendment, and that something was recognition of the panoply of "rights" identified in Miranda. Subsequent
to Miranda, the Court has spoken of the Fifth Amendment "right"
to counsel69 and, more generally, has equated the full panoply of
Miranda rights with the Fifth Amendment itself.7 °
There are two problems with this interpretation. First, if the
many elements of Miranda are all part of the Fifth Amendment
right, then it is difficult to understand the meaning of Miranda's
invitation to develop "fully effective" alternative safeguards.7 Second, as Justice Scalia observed, this understanding of Miranda collides with subsequent decisions, such as Michigan v Tucker,72 which
are difficult to reconcile with the idea that Miranda is a constitutional rule.
But there is an alternative understanding of Miranda that makes
sense of the "invitation." Under this understanding, Miranda decided only what Dickerson identified as Miranda'score holding: that
the Fifth Amendment requires "apprising accused persons of their
right of silence and.., assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it."73 Thus, what the Fifth Amendment requires is not every
aspect of the Miranda procedure, but only that an accused learn
of the right not to speak with the police, and that the interrogation
take place in a manner that permits the suspect to exercise that
right at any time.
This also is a plausible understanding of the Fifth Amendment.
Whether one can be said to possess a right of which he is ignorant
is a difficult question, and just because the Court has answered

69See, e.g., Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477, 481 ("Miranda thus declared that an accused
has a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation.").
" See Dickerson, 120 S Ct at 2334 n 5 (citing Withrow v Williams, 507 US 680, 691
(1993); Illinois v Perkins, 496 US 292, 296 (1990); Butler v McKellar,494 US 407, 411 (1990);
Michigan v Jackson, 475 US 625, 629 (1986); Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412, 427 (1986);
Edwards, 451 US at 481-82).
71Miranda, 384 US at 478-79.
72 417 US 433 (1974). See also Oregon v Elstad, 470 US 298, 308 (1985) (treating Tucker
as holding that fruit of poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations).
" Dickerson, 120 S Ct at 2334 (quoting Miranda).
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that question affirmatively in some areas (for example, consent to
search under the Fourth Amendment)7 4 does not mean it cannot
be answered in the negative with regard to the Fifth Amendment
right. Knowing and intelligent waiver is the standard for trial
rights,7" and the Court and commentators regularly draw the connection between what goes on during police questioning and the
subsequent trial.
Nor is there anything especially odd about the right applying
at the stationhouse. Indeed, by its terms the right should apply to
any governmental conduct, no matter where it occurs. A confession that is a product of torture, for example, would plainly violate
the Fifth Amendment (as well as Due Process) even if it took place
in a home. Finally, it requires little to insist that the right remain
effective throughout interrogation; whether or not custodial police
interrogation carries with it quite the coercive effect the Miranda
Court suggested, custodial interrogation undoubtedly places some
substantial pressure on suspects to confess.
We favor this interpretation of Miranda, even though it too runs
afoul of several post-Miranda decisions. This problem is not as
large as Justice Scalia takes it to be, however, for solving it requires only that the Court retract some of its ill-considered dicta
and rethink the rationales of several decisions. Whether the postMiranda decisions are viable depends upon whether any given outcome can be explained by the interpretation we have offered of
Miranda. This in turn requires of the Supreme Court only that it
work on a case-by-case basis to justify its holdings in constitutional
terms. 76
Under this approach, some post-Miranda decisions clearly are
defensible.77 On the other hand, some post-Miranda decisions
71See Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218 (1973).
71See Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464 (1938); see also Schneckloth, 412 US at 235

(distinguishing between waiver of trial rights and other situations in which a person may
fail to invoke "a constitutional protection").
" Donald Dripps engages in a similar endeavor, arguing that all of the cases relying on
a "prophylactic" interpretation of Miranda can be squared with the decision itself. See
Donald Dripps, Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A Proposed Fifth Amendment Synthesis,
17 Const Comm 19 (2000). While we are not persuaded that Dripps succeeds in squaring
all of the cases with Miranda, his endeavor is the correct one.
17 New York v Quarles, for example, held that a Miranda violation is excused if the public
safety demands that a subject be questioned immediately without warnings. See 467 US
649 (1984). See id at 656-57. Few rights are absolute, and all Quarlesdoes is to acknowledge
that some balancing is appropriate.
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are more dubious,7" and some will present difficult cases.79 The
Court will have to overrule, reconceptualize, or at least further justify some of its rights-expanding decisions as well as its rightscontracting ones."

78Michigan v Tucker is a good example. If Miranda is a constitutional rule, and if in fact
it violates the Constitution to fail to warn a suspect of the right to remain silent, then it
is difficult to see how we can avoid excluding the fruits of unwarned statements. To be
sure, if one thought that unlawfully coercive interrogation completed a Miranda violation
in the way that an illegal search completes a Fourth Amendment violation, one might also
think that neither suppression of the confession nor its fruits is constitutionally required.
A damages remedy might suffice. However, in assuming that Miranda's core is a constitutional rule, we have been assuming that the core includes the right to suppression of
a confession obtained in violation of Miranda. If that is so, there appears to be no good
reason to distinguish the confession from its fruits.
One might question why it necessarily follows that the fruits of constitutional violations
must be excluded, but the proper focus of attention is on the relationship between the
violation and the fruit, not on some wholesale rule. The confession obtained from a tortured
suspect is "just" the fruit of the violation. So is the witness discovered through that same
torture, and the buried murder weapon (whether located from the suspect's testimony or
from that of the witness the suspect identified). The Supreme Court's doctrine accounts
for these distinctions by, inter alia, permitting the introduction of evidence if the causal
chain between government misconduct and the evidence has been attenuated, see Wong
Sun v United States, 371 US 471 (1963), or if the fruit is evidence likely to have been
discovered anyway, see Nix v Williams, 467 US 431 (1984). We do not mean to endorse
any particular decision regarding the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine; our point is that
those doctrines should be applied consistently when a constitutional violation is at stake.

'9A good example is Harris v New York, which held that statements inadmissible in a
case-in-chief because of a Miranda violation can nonetheless be admitted for impeachment
purposes. See 401 US 222, 226 (1970). Whether a balancing of the interest in preventing
perjury against the Fifth Amendment right justifies the rule most likely will have to be
decided on a case-by-case basis if it applies at all. See id at 225-26 (discussing competing
value of excluding perjury). Oregon v Elstad presents another thorny problem. See 470 US
298 (1985). Elstad held that if a suspect made a statement in violation of Miranda, a subsequent statement made shortly thereafter is admissible if Mirandawarnings are administered
before the second statement and the first statement is not involuntary. See id at 314. But
that decision becomes difficult to justify in light of Brown v Illinois's holding that the Miranda warnings are not talismanic. See Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 603 ("Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always make the act sufficiently a product of free will to
break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and
the confession."). Given that the Fifth Amendment is in part about a concern for voluntariness, it is difficult to understand why administering the warnings would be talismanic for
Fifth Amendment purposes, but not so for the Fourth Amendment. Elstad perhaps could
be explained, but Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court relies on the nonconstitutional
understanding of Miranda, and that will not wash. See Elstad, 470 US at 306 (stating that
the Miranda exclusionary rule "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself").
80One candidate for further explanation under the narrowed interpretation of Miranda
is Edwards v Arizona, holding that once the Fifth Amendment "right" to counsel is invoked,
the suspect cannot even be questioned following a second set of warnings by different
officers as to a different offense. See 451 US 477, 484-45 (1981). Because the Fifth Amendment, like the Sixth Amendment, tends to be treated as offense-specific, some more reasoning is necessary to maintain the Edwards holding. Perhaps the Court could provide such
an explanation, but it has not done so.
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MIRANDA AFTER DICKERSON: SHARED CONSTITUTIONAL

D.

INTERPRETATION

This discussion still leaves unanswered how we should understand all the rules in Miranda that seem to go beyond this understanding of the decision. Was the Court entitled to speak about
the "right" to counsel and insist that counsel be provided to indigents? Isn't this the very sort of prophylaxis that we already have
said is unnecessary to make sense of the case?
The answer to this question turns out to be related to what Miranda's invitation meant, that is, what Congress and the states can
do after Dickerson. What if Congress decided after Dickerson, or
after Miranda for that matter, that it wanted to take the Court up
on its invitation to try something different? As we have seen, if
every aspect of Miranda is constitutionally required, the invitation
seems empty. But even though Dickerson describes some aspects of
Miranda as constitutionally required, it does not go this far.
Rather, it treats the invitation as having meaning.
Suppose that in the aftermath of Dickerson Congress passed
the "Anti-Coercion and Effective Custodial Interrogation Act"
("ACECIA"). The statute mandates that any suspect taken into
custody by federal officers must be told of the right to remain
silent before any interrogation commences, that any such interrogation must be videotaped from beginning to end, and that counsel
may not attend the interrogation (except, of course, after the onset
of adversarial criminal proceedings)."1
ACECIA is but one of several possible responses Congress
might offer to Miranda/Dickerson.Others are easily imagined, such
as requiring that all interrogation take place before a magistrate,
or dispensing with police-administered warnings altogether but
forbidding any custodial interrogation without the presence of the
suspect's attorney. The point is that Congress could devise several
ways of dealing with interrogations that do not accord the full panoply of Miranda guarantees, but address the twin concerns of informing a suspect of the right to remain silent and ensuring compliance with this right throughout the interrogation.8 2
In order to determine what the Court might say about such a
sI See Massiab v United States, 377 US 201 (1964); Brewer v Williams, 430 US 387 (1977).
82

See Kanisar, 85 Cornell L Rev at 912 (cited in note 32).
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congressional response, we need only return to Miranda itself. The
Court's opinion is revealing in a way that has received little attention. For the opinion does not simply extend an "invitation," but
also characterizes its approach not as a "rule," but as a "guideline."8 3 The Court explains that it granted certiorari "to explore
some facets of the problems . . . of applying the privilege against
self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete
constitutional guidelinesfor law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." '8 4 The Court sets out its "holding" at the outset, and that
holding is only that the prosecution may not use statements made
in custodial interrogation "unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure" the privilege.85 And "[a]s for
the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless otherfully effective
means are devised to inform the accused persons of their right of silence
and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it" the specific Miranda guidelines are required.86 The Court then devotes an entire
paragraph to encouraging governmental bodies to devise their own
ways of safeguarding the right. 87 At least twice more, the Court
88
repeats the holding and re-extends the invitation.
In other words, the best way to understand Miranda is not as
mandating specific procedures, but as laying down a right and creating a safe harbor for those charged with respecting it. According
to Miranda, the Constitution requires the government to inform
suspects of their right to remain silent and to safeguard that right
throughout the interrogation. Other actors are then encouraged
to develop alternative ways to achieve these goals.
From this discussion it ought to be apparent that the problem
is not so much with Miranda, but with the way subsequent decisions have characterized Miranda, both under-enforcing and overenforcing the guidelines. Indeed, Miranda's "invitation" serves
only to make explicit what is always implicit-that it is always open
to political actors to offer a competing vision of the requirements
of the Constitution. After the Supreme Court held unconstitu83384 US at 442.
Id at 441-42 (emphasis added).
85 Id at 444.

86Id at 444-45 (emphasis added).
8' See id at 467.
88See id at 478-79, 490.

HeinOnline -- 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81 20002

SHARED CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

83

tional Texas's prosecution of a flag burner, 9 Congress was entitled to, in effect, urge the Court to reconsider that judgment, by
enacting a federal law that attempted to prohibit burning the
American flag,9" just as the Court, in turn, was entitled to reject
Congress's plea.9" There is, admittedly, a sensitive and difficult
constitutional line between appropriate testing of constitutional
bounds and defiance. That is the problem that was presented in
Cooper v Aaron92 and some of the more extreme responses to Roe
v Wade. 93 But generally a legislature passing laws subject to the
ordinary process of judicial review will be on the permissible side
of the line.
Of course, in the end the say is the Court's. The Court stated
as much in Miranda, pointing out that "the issues presented are
of constitutional dimensions and must be determined by the
courts." 94 But this, standing alone, is nothing but the rule of Marbury, in its most modest form. In a case involving admission of a
confession, a court must determine whether admission is consistent
with constitutional commands.
In light of these familiar understandings, it becomes clearer what
the Court should do with ACECIA. The Court should weigh
ACECIA against the rule that Dickerson defines as the heart of Miranda. The Court should ask whether the ACECIA procedures are
as effective as the Miranda warnings at informing suspects of their
right to silence and ensuring a continuous opportunity to exercise
that right. The procedures of ACECIA seem to measure up. 95 In8

See
oSee
" See
92358

Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397 (1989).
Flag Protection Act of 1989, 103 Stat 777, codified at 18 USCA § 700 (Supp 1990).
United States v Eichman, 496 US 310 (1990).
US 1 (1958).

93410 US 113 (1973).
'4384 US at 490.
" While the videotaping of confessions will in the vast run of cases be enough to assure
that both the Miranda and voluntariness components of the Fifth Amendment are met,
there may be cases that require further elaboration of the statute or the constitutional rule.
Perhaps the Court will find that a defendant subjected to hours and hours of interrogation
could not have exercised free will. Perhaps the Court will conclude from a particular videotape that the process of interrogation so strained the suspect that he or she was not sufficiendy of right mind to confess. Perhaps gaps in the videotape or the chronology from the
time of arrest to the time of an incriminating statement will suggest that the police engaged
in illegal practices when the machine was not recording. See Stephan v State, 711 P2d 1156,
1164 (Alaska 1985) (excluding the defendant's statement where "a police officer, in his own
discretion, chose to turn the recorder on twenty minutes into the interview rather than at
the beginning"); Wayne T. Westling and Vicki Waye, Videotaping Police Interrogations:Les-
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forming the suspect of the right to silence is a key component of
Miranda/Dickerson, and videotaping provides adequate protection
of the right to continuous exercise of the privilege.96
Note, however, that the ultimate answer will emerge in the context of specific cases addressing whether particular suspects were
adequately informed of their right to silence and whether they
were the beneficiaries of procedural safeguards adequate to ensure
a continuous opportunity to exercise it.97 This is as it should be,
and perhaps where Miranda went wrong. The appropriate complaint about Miranda is not that it departed from the traditional
involuntariness test, for as we have seen, rights evolve. But the
Miranda Court could have worked itself through to its essential
holding on a case-by-case basis. Whether or not this was a necessity-and recognizing, ironically, that the bright-line nature of the
Miranda decision might have done law enforcement a favor-the
Court would have been subjected to less criticism had it worked
incrementally.9 8
The most difficult part of ACECIA is the denial of counsel. This
too might survive constitutional scrutiny after Dickerson, for most

sons from Australia, 25 Am J Crim L 493, 533-34 (1998) (describing the Australian
experience).
96See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An EmpiricalReassessment, 90 Nw U L Rev
387, 487 (1996) ("Videotaping interrogations would certainly be as effective as Miranda in
preventing police coercion and probably more so."). Of course, nothing in Miranda prevents
federal or state officials from videotaping confessions in addition to providing counsel and
all of the standard warnings. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda'sPracticalEffect: Substantial
Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw U L Rev 501, 556 (1996). By enacting
ACECIA Congress would be making a judgment that videotaping should substitute for,
rather than supplement, a right to counsel and the accompanying warnings. Compare Philip
E. Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the MirandaDoctrine, 24 Am Crim L Rev 303, 306,
313 (1987) (proposing audiotaping or videotaping as a recommended measure, possibly to
be made mandatory after a period of study).
" See generally Harold J. Krent, How to Move Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: Structuring
Judicial Response to Legislative Reform Efforts, 26 Pepperdine L Rev 855, 871-74 (1999) (discussing Supreme Court evaluation of a similar question-alternative remedies to exclusion
under the Fourth Amendment-in the context of specific cases). Although the ultimate
determination regarding any set of procedures would thus await concrete cases, declaratory
relief should be liberally available to ensure that government officials do not engage in
widespread illegal activity and to assure those same officials that a proposed set of alternative
safeguards will not be ruled categorically inadequate. See Michael C. Dorf and Charles F.
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum L Rev 267, 462-64 (1998)
(urging a variant on the latter to avoid stifling experimentation by governments fearful of
judicial overturning of convictions).
9 Compare Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 NYU L Rev 1185,
1198-1205 (1992) (making the same point with respect to Roe).
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of the Court's decisions treat the right to counsel as existing only
in the service of the Fifth Amendment's commands, not as a core
part of that Amendment, and the videotaping requirement should
achieve the central goal of providing counsel in this setting.99
What is more interesting to us than any particular answer the
Court might provide is how much room proper constitutional process should leave for other actors. Miranda's "invitation" was quite
specific, but the Congress that enacted Section 3501 did not take
it seriously. Congress simply denied the Court's interpretation of
the Constitution. Thus, the Court's invalidation of the statute in
Dickerson is not surprising. But a serious legislative effort along
the lines of ACECIA would deserve serious consideration by the
Court.
II.

CONGRESS, THE STATES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER

The controversy in Dickerson raised a question of separation
of powers-a contest between Congress and the Court. In this
part we consider the implications of Dickerson in the contest between the states and the federal government. We conclude that
the power granted to Congress by Dickerson gives it substantial
control over the states, but consistent with our themes of shared
interpretation, experimentation, humility, and respect, we believe
Congress should be reluctant to exercise its power in a manner
that limits state choices. Inherent in that conclusion, of course, is
our belief (discussed in Part III) that just as Congress has power
after Dickerson to pass legislation altering Miranda's guidelines, so
too do the states.
A. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO SUPPLEMENT MIRANDA

Consider now a variant of ACECIA, the "National AntiCoercion Act" ("NACA"). It states, "Absent a demonstration that
videotaping was not possible in a particular case, no statement that

I

Obviously the statutory rule would fail if the confession were taken after the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached. And admittedly there is ambiguity in the case lawfrom Escobedo v State of Illinois if not before-as to whether there is an independent right
to counsel in the custodial interrogation setting. See 378 US 478 (1964). Some of the
continuing ambiguity arises from the fact "that Miranda did not build on the approach
taken in Escobedo as much as it displaced it." Kamisar, 85 Cornell L Rev at 885 n 3 (cited
in note 32) (emphasis in original).
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is the product of custodial interrogation shall be admissible as evidence against the maker of that statement in any state or federal
court unless the entire period of custodial interrogation, beginning
with a warning that the suspect has the right to remain silent, was
videotaped." '0 0 Unlike ACECIA, which substitutes alternative procedures for three of the four Miranda warnings, NACA supplements the warnings. In addition, and more importantly for present
purposes, whereas ACECIA applies only to the federal government, NACA applies to the states as well. Under NACA, states
would be permitted to give the full Miranda warnings in addition
to videotaping custodial interrogation, but could not refuse to use
videotaping. Is this constitutional?
1. The commerce power. From 1937 through 1995, the Supreme
Court took an expansive view of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.' 0 ' Of particular note, the commerce power was
used regularly to justify civil rights legislation." 2 Most observers
assumed that to sustain federal regulatory power over some activity
it was necessary only to explain how that activity was connected
to interstate commerce, and, of course, in a modern economy every activity is, in some measure, so connected. Accordingly, it came
to be assumed that Congress could enact virtually any law under
03
its commerce power.
Thus, until recently, one might have tried to justify NACA under the Commerce Clause. The argument might have gone something like this: By requiring the videotaping of custodial inter00Those readers who are skeptical that Congress would ever pass a statute that seems
to extend a new right to suspects may wish to imagine further that NACA responds to
some widely publicized police scandal or is packaged with other measures that crack down
on crime.
"' In NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US I (1937), the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. As the four dissenters noted, in affirming Congress's
power to regulate manufacturing, the Court departed from a stricter view of the Commerce
Clause that had prevailed earlier in the century. See NLRB v Friedman-HarryMarks Clothing
Co., 301 US 58, 78 (1937) (McReynolds dissenting from decisions in several cases) (objecting
to federal regulation of "purely local industry beyond anything heretofore deemed permissible."). The Court did not again strike down a law as beyond the scope of the Commerce
Clause until its decision in United States v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995).
112 See, e.g., Katzenbach v McClung, 379 US 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v
United States, 379 US 241 (1964).
' See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw 313 (2d ed 1988) ("The
doctrinal rules courts currently employ to determine whether federal legislation is affirmatively authorized under the commerce clause do not themselves effectively limit the power
of Congress.").
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rogation, NACA increases the demand for videotape, for video
recording devices, and for employees who operate video recording
devices. The tape and the recording devices are articles of commerce that move in an interstate market, and some people will
cross state lines to find work operating the video recording devices.
Accordingly, the argument concludes, NACA regulates interstate
commerce.
United States v Lopez 1 4 and United States v Morrison1"5 make clear
that this sort of argument no longer works. Whatever the outer
boundaries of the Commerce Clause after these decisions, NACA
is outside them.
Arguably, Lopez itself, which struck down the Gun Free School
Zones Act, held merely that Commerce Clause legislation must in
fact regulate something that has a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce,10 6 and indicated that without such a requirement Congress's powers may seem to be without limit. However, Morrison,
which invalidated the civil remedy provision of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), restates the constitutional test formalistically. Morrison requires that if Congress regulates some activity because of its substantial effects on interstate commerce, the
01 7
regulated activity must be "some sort of economic endeavor."
The fact that NACA would have an effect on interstate commerce is thus irrelevant. The same was true of the Gun Free
School Zones Act and VAWA. Like firearm possession and gendermotivated violence-the activities Congress sought to regulate in
Lopez and Morrison, respectively-neither custodial interrogation
nor the introduction of evidence at a criminal trial is likely to strike
04514 US 549 (1995).
105 120 S Ct 1740 (2000).

0 There are two other branches of the commerce power: the regulation of the "channels" and "instrumentalities" of interstate commerce, neither of which was applicable in
Lopez, see id at 559, and neither of which is applicable here.
' United States v Morrison, 120 S Ct 1740, 1750 (2000) (citing Lopez, 514 US at 55960). Lopez may have made sense as an attempt to define the permissible boundaries of
congressional regulation under its enumerated powers, but Morrison-atleast as it was written-signals a regrettable return to pre-1937 formalism. Moreover, Morrison seems in some
ways an attempt by the Chief Justice to resuscitate his opinion in 1976 in National League
of Cities v Usery, 426 US 833 (1976). That would be unfortunate, given that the constitutional structure does seem to imply an attempt to define enumerated powers, whereas National League of Cities' notion of a traditional state function, see id at 849-52, finds no place
in the Constitution. See Thomas R. McCoy and Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending:
Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 Supreme Court Review 85, 114 (1988).
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the Court as "economic activity" or as having a "substantial effect"
on interstate commerce. Accordingly, NACA presents a fairly easy
case under current doctrine. It is not authorized by the Commerce
Clause.
2. The "Morgan"power.Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
is a plausible source of congressional power to enact NACA. It
authorizes Congress "to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. One of
those substantive provisions is the Due Process Clause, which,
through the incorporation doctrine, is the basis for applying the
Fifth Amendment to the states.
Katzenbach v Morgan'°8 was probably the high-water mark of the
Section 5 power. In that case, the Court upheld a provision of the
federal Voting Rights Act forbidding states to condition the vote
of any person educated in a Puerto Rican Spanish-instruction
school on English literacy, notwithstanding the fact that the Court
had earlier upheld a state-imposed English literacy test.0 9 The
Court reasoned that Section 5 grants Congress the power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment independent of any adjudicated
violation of its terms,"' and Congress could reasonably have determined that proscribing English literacy tests was necessary to combat state-sponsored discrimination in voting. The Court was emphatic, however, that "§ 5 grants Congress no power to restrict,
abrogate, or dilute the[] guarantees" of the Fourteenth Amendment,'" even as it authorizes Congress to go beyond what the
courts require. Section 5 was thus a "ratchet."" 2 Congress could
add to but not subtract from the protection the Court itself afforded constitutional rights.
But what kind of ratchet is Section 5? Does it authorize Congress to define the content of the substantive provisions of the

10

384 US 641 (1966).

"0See id at 649 (distinguishing Lassiter v Northampton Election Bd., 360 US 45 (1959)).
"'See Morgan, 384 US at 648-49.
l'Id at 651.
Il See William Cohen, CongressionalPower to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection,
27 Stan L Rev 603, 613 (1975); Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56
Mont L Rev 145, 152-69 (1995); Matt Pawa, Comment: When the Supreme Court Restricts
Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 141 U Pa L Rev 1029, 1062-69 (1993); Lawrence G. Sager, FairMeasure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212, 1230 (1978).
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Fourteenth Amendment independent of the Court's own jurisprudence, and then enact legislation designed to "enforce" the Congressional interpretation? The Court approved that approach with
respect to Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment in Jones v A/fred H. Mayer Co., 113 and parts of Morgan appeared to acknowledge a parallel enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 114 Individual Justices strongly criticized
this view of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, in two postMorgan cases.115
The Rehnquist Court's interest in defending state sovereignty
against what it considers congressional overreaching spelled doom
for the substantive ratchet theory. After all, a substantive ratchet
is inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Court's insistence in Lopez that there are limits to Congress's affirmative
powers. Virtually any law, indeed, any human action, can, on some
rational understanding, be seen to deprive someone of life, liberty,
property, or equality; thus, a congressional power to enforce Congress's own definition of the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment could well become the sort of plenary congressional power that the Lopez Court was at pains to reject under the
Commerce Clause.
the Court formally
Unsurprisingly, just two years after Lopez,
117
116
renounced the substantive ratchet theory. City ofBoerne v Flores
held that Section 5 did not authorize the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act'18 (RFRA), which required that
laws of general applicability be subject to strict judicial scrutiny in
those instances in which they imposed a substantial burden on religion. Because the Court had previously ruled that such generally
applicable laws do not trigger heightened scrutiny, 9 the Court
13392 US 409 (1968).
114See Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US 641, 653-56 (1966).
" See EEOC v Wyoming, 460 US 226, 262 (1983) (Burger dissenting) ("Allowing Congress to protect constitutional rights statutorily that it has independently defined fundamentally alters our scheme of government."); Oregon v Mitchell, 400 US 112, 205 (1970) (Harlan
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at 296 (Stewart concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"'See Boerne, 521 US at 519-29.
17521 US 507 (1997).
"lPub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488 (1993), codified at 42 USC § 2000bb (1994).
"' See Employment Div. v Smith, 494 US 872 (1990).
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deemed RFRA an impermissible effort to exercise a substantive
ratchet power.
Boerne nonetheless recognized that Section 5 grants Congress
a remedial ratchet power, that is, a power to enact remedial or
preventative measures for what the Court itself would consider to
be violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the Court
would not itself require the specific remedial or preventative measures. 2 ° That recognition was necessary to reconcile Boerne with
Morgan and other cases, and more importantly, to avoid rendering
Section 5 nugatory.
The Court's simultaneous disavowal of a substantive ratchet and
recognition of a remedial ratchet in Boerne gave rise to an obvious
difficulty: how to distinguish the two. In Morgan, for example, the
Court characterized the challenged provision as either a remedy
for official discrimination or an extension of substantive protection
against voting discrimination beyond what the Court had required.
The mechanism the Court used in Boerne for discerning permissible remedial measures from impermissible efforts to ratchet up
substantive constitutional protection was a means/ends test. There
must be a "congruence and proportionality" between what the
Court would recognize as a constitutional violation and the means
" ' otherwise,
Congress chooses to remedy or prevent that violation;12
the Court will assume that Congress is merely dressing a substantive ratchet in remedial garb.
Is NACA congruent and proportional to violations of the Fifth
Amendment? That depends on how close a fit between means and
ends is demanded. Even after Lopez and Morrison, the general standard for determining whether an Act falls within one of Congress's
enumerated powers is the quite deferential necessary-and-proper
test of McCulloch v Maryland 122 "Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
20See Boerne, 521 US at 518 ("Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it
prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres
of autonomy previously reserved to the States."' (quoting Fitzpatrick v Bitzer, 427 US 445,
455 (1976)).
1 Boerne, 521 US at 519.
22 17 US (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819).
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are constitutional."' 2 3 The Court has applied the necessary-andproper test quite deferentially when Congress has invoked its powers to enforce the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,12 4 and
one might therefore expect similar deference in the Fourteenth
Amendment context.
However, in four recent cases the Court has held that federal
laws were not justified under the Section 5 power.12 5 This pattern
suggests that congruence and proportionality is a demanding standard.'26 Nevertheless, NACA satisfies the standard the Court has
applied in the recent Section 5 decisions.
123Id at 421.
124See Jones v Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 US 409, 443-44 (1968) (Thirteenth Amendment);

South Carolina v Katzenbacb, 383 US 301, 326 (1966) (Fifteenth Amendment); City of Rome
v United States, 446 US 156, 175 (1980) (Fifteenth Amendment).
125 See Morrison, 120 S Ct 1740 (2000); Kimelv Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S Ct 631 (2000);
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v College Savings Bank, 527 US 627 (1999);
Boerne, 521 US 507.
126 Contrasting Boerne with a Fifteenth Amendment case, City of Rome v United States,
446 US 156 (1980), suggests that congruence and proportionality is a stricter test than
necessary and proper. In Rome, as in Boerne, Congress sought to substitute what could be
described as a disparate impact test for a judicially mandated purposeful discrimination test.
Applying the necessary-and-proper test, the Court deferred to Congress's chosen means in
Rome; applying the congruence and proportionality test, the Court invalidated Congress's
handiwork in Boerne. See Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American ConstitutionalLaw 933-36 (3d ed
1999).
Is the Court justified in applying a stricter standard of review to legislation under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment than under the other Civil War Amendments (not to
mention Congress's powers under Article I, Section 8)? One might reconcile the cases by
noting that, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 power, the power to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment does not pose a risk of becoming a plenary power. The Fifteenth
Amendment is limited to a much narrower subject matter-race discrimination in votingthan the Fourteenth Amendment. Hence, it could be argued, the Court can afford to grant
Congress greater deference under the Fifteenth Amendment than under the Fourteenth.
Although this line of argument may work for the Fifteenth Amendment, it does not work
for the Thirteenth Amendment. Under Jones, "Congress is free, within the broad limits of
reason, to recognize whatever rights it wishes, define the infringement of those rights as
a form of domination or subordination and thus an aspect of slavery, and proscribe such
infringement as a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment." Tribe, 1American Constitutional
Law at 927 (cited above). And because the Thirteenth Amendment contains no state action
requirement, this means that "Congress would possess nearly plenary authority under the
Thirteenth amendment to protect all but the most trivial individual rights from both governmental and private invasion." Id. Accordingly, the difference in wording and subject
matter among the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments does not justify the
narrower approach that the Court has lately taken toward the Fourteenth.
Nonetheless, we do not mean to suggest that the Civil War Amendment cases are strictly
irreconcilable with one another. For example, one could think that Boerne and Rome are
both rightly decided. Given our nation's long history of racial discrimination in voting, in
1965 (the date of passage of the Voting Rights Act), it was entirely plausible for Congress
to conclude that many or most changes in voting rules that have a disparate racial impact
are in fact motivated by official racial animus, even if specific proof of such animus is
unavailable in particular cases. By contrast, in 1993 (the date of passage of the Religious
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In Florida PrepaidPostsecondary Education Expense Board v College
Savings Bank,127 the most restrictive of the Section 5 decisions, the
Court held that Section 5 did not authorize Congress to subject
nonconsenting states to suit in federal court for violating patent
rights. Although the Court accepted that patent rights are "property" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause, 128 the Court nonetheless found a lack of congruence and proportionality. Selectively citing procedural due process
cases, the Court asserted that a patent violation by the state violates due process only if the state fails to provide an adequate remedy. 129 Because Congress had compiled what the Court considered
insufficient evidence that states were failing to provide remedies
for their own patent violations, the Court found a lack of congruence and proportionality. 3 °
Standing alone, Florida Prepaidis deeply troubling: it appears to
abandon any notion that the Court and Congress are partners in
enforcing the Constitution. Why was Congress's Section 5 "preventative" power insufficient to justify the statute? The Court's
answer is that the remedy was not, in its view, necessary to protect
constitutional rights.' But necessity cannot be the touchstone under Section 5, for by hypothesis Congress may enact measures that
Freedom Restoration Act), Congress had no reason to believe that any but a tiny handful
of the generally applicable laws that, from time to time, impose substantial burdens on the
free exercise of religion were adopted out of religious animus. The Boerne Court itself
appeared to endorse this distinction between race and religion. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 US
at 531 ("In contrast to the record which confronted Congress and the judiciary in the
voting rights cases, RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry. The history of persecution in this
country detailed in the hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years.").
Thus, the different outcomes in Rome and Boerne could be taken to mean that the Court
applied a consistent standard of review, which the Voting Rights Act satisfied and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act did not. The outcomes alone do not logically entail that
the Court applied different standards.
127527 US 627 (1999).
128See id at 642.

121See id at 642-43 (citing Zinermon v Burch, 494 US 113, 125 (1990); Parrattv Taylor,
451 US 527, 539-31 (1981); Hudson v Palmer, 468 US 517, 532-53 (1984); id at 539
(O'Connor concurring). As the dissent observed, these cases only establish that negligent
deprivations of property do not violate the Due Process Clause if there is an adequate state
postdeprivation remedy; a willful deprivation is a completed Due Process violation at the
moment it occurs. See Florida Prepaid, 527 US at 653 (Stevens dissenting) (citing Daniels
v Williams, 474 US 327, 332-34 (1986)).
10 See id at 643-44.

.3See Tribe, 1 American ConstitutionalLaw at 958 (cited in note 126).
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go beyond what the Court itself deems necessary. In Florida Prepaid the Court appears to have forgotten the purpose of the congruence and proportionality test: to distinguish between legitimate
and sham remedial or preventative measures. There was no serious
argument in Florida Prepaid that Congress had, as in RFRA, attempted to redefine the substance of constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court should have deferred to Congress. Instead, it apparently mandated "something between intermediate and strict
scrutiny , ' of Congressional enactments pursuant to the Section
5 power.
Florida Prepaid is an aberration. The Court's other recent Section 5 cases are not quite so constricting. In particular, last Term's
decision in Kimel v FloridaBoard of Regents133 used the congruence
and proportionality test for its original purpose: to smoke out a
13 4
Congressional effort to exercise a substantive ratchet power. It
is striking that, despite the division within the Court over questions of federalism, none of the Justices have questioned the congruence and proportionality test in principle.13 5 We believe this
Id at 959.
120 S Ct 631 (2000).
134In Kimel the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
could not be justified under the Section 5 power. Age discrimination, in the Court's view,
is unconstitutional only if irrational, and Congress had identified no pattern of age discrimination, much less a pattern of irrational age discrimination. See id at 649. In this respect,
the ADEA was plausibly understood as an illicit attempt by Congress to treat age as a
suspect classification in the face of judicial decisions holding that it is not. See Gregory v
Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 473 (1991); Vance v Bradley, 440 US 93, 102-03 (1979); Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v Murgia,427 US 307, 317 (1976) (per curiam). To be sure, age discrinination, like most forms of discrimination, is subject to mere rational basis scrutiny out of
deference to Congress and state legislatures. By reserving heightened scrutiny for the most
invidious forms of discrimination, the Court leaves room for the operation of the democratic
process. Arguably, a parallel principle of respect for a coordinate branch of government
should mean that Congress is also entitled to deference when it determines that age discrimination is sufficiently invidious to warrant a legislative solution. But this argument leads
ultimately to the very substantive ratchet theory that Boerne rejected, and thus it is not
surprising that the Kimel Court (implicitly) rejected the argument.
"I By contrast with Florida Prepaid, in neither Kimel nor Boerne was there any dissent
from the application of the congruence and proportionality test itself. In Boerne, the dissenters objected to the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, rather than its insistence that Congress had gone beyond that interpretation. Boerne, 521 US at 544-45
(O'Connor dissenting); id at 565 (Souter dissenting); id at 566 (Breyer dissenting). In both
Florida Prepaid and IKimel, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer objected to the
doctrine, first announced in Seminole Tribe, that permits Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to the Section 5 power but not when acting pursuant
to its Article I powers. But only in FloridaPrepaid did these same four Justices object further
to the way in which the majority applied the congruence and proportionality test. In Morrison v United States, the Court held that Section 5 did not authorize the provision of the
"3

'3
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agreement136 stems from the fact that Boerne's original judgmentthat RFRA was an effort to expand substantive protection for free
exercise rights rather than to remedy or prevent religious discrimination-was basically sound.
What implications do the recent cases have for Congress's
power to supplement Miranda? If, as Florida Prepaidsuggests, the
Section 5 power may be exercised only if an act of Congress is,
in the Court's view, necessary to remedy or prevent a recognized
constitutional violation, NACA's requirement that all custodial interrogation be videotaped would be plainly unconstitutional, for
Miranda and Dickerson make clear that the Miranda warnings are
sufficient to satisfy the Constitution.
Moreover, both Florida Prepaid and Morrison criticize Congress
for enacting statutes that apply nationwide when the underlying
problem might have been restricted to particular states or regions.'37 To the extent that these criticisms state a constitutional
requirement, NACA would need to be limited to those places for
which there was evidence before Congress of a pattern of coerced
confessions-and even that might not be sufficient for a targeted
NACA, given the presumptive adequacy of the Miranda warnings.
Nonetheless, we think that NACA, even if applicable nationwide, would be valid under Section 5. As indicated above, Florida
Prepaid is aberrational in the standard it applies. The Court's rulings in each of its other recent decisions rejecting Congress's efforts to use the Section 5 power are plausibly understood to rest
Violence Against Women Act that created a federal civil remedy for victims of gendermotivated violence. 120 S Ct 1740 (2000). The Court relied mainly on nineteenth-century
precedents invalidating Acts of Congress that sought to regulate private conduct pursuant
to Section 5. See id at 1756 (discussing United States v Harris, 106 US 629 (1883) and the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3 (1883)). The Court then rejected the claim that Congress
had provided a right of action against private actors as the means by which persons who
would otherwise face official discrimination in state courts could circumvent that constitutional wrong. See id at 1758-59. Two of the dissenters did not reach the Section 5 question,
as they would have sustained the law under the Commerce Clause. Justice Breyer, writing
for himself and Justice Stevens, expressed doubt about the soundness of the Court's Section
5 analysis, see id at 1778-80 (Breyer dissenting), although not about the congruence and
proportionality test itself. See id at 1779 (distinguishing Boerne).
136 Accord Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, The Uncertain Future of FederalAntidiscrimination Law: Morrison, Kamel, and the Dismantling of Congressional Section 5 Powers 2 (draft
on file with authors) ("This silence is remarkable.").
137 Morrison, 120 S Ct at 1759 (contrasting VAWA with statutes "directed only to the
State where the evil found by Congress existed"); Florida Prepaid, 120 S Ct at 646-47
("Congress did nothing to ... confine the reach of the Act by ... providing for suits only
against States with questionable remedies or a high incidence of infringement.").
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on the view that Congress was attempting to exercise a substantive
ratchet power it lacks: in Boerne, Congress expanded free exercise
protection; in Kimel, it attempted to recognize a new suspect class;
and in Morrison, it lifted the state action requirement. Thus, with
the exception of Florida Prepaid, congruence and proportionality
has been a test of congressional motivation-asking whether Congress was really enacting permissible remedial and preventative
measures or illegitimately attempting to change the substantive
meaning of the Constitution.
There can be little doubt that NACA is designed as a remedial
and preventative provision. To be sure, one could characterize
NACA as creating a substantive right to videotaping, but that characterization would not make sense in context. Presumably, Congress would enact NACA in order to implement the Fifth Amendment rights of suspects subject to custodial interrogation, not to
establish videotaping as a right in itself. 38 Thus, if the congruence
and proportionality test is applied properly, NACA should satisfy
it. 39 For far from an effort to circumvent Court-set limits, NACA
responds to the Court's direct invitation to Congress in Miranda
to devise alternative safeguards.
To be clear, we are not saying that the Miranda invitation by
itself authorizes NACA. It is possible to read that invitation as
applying to Congress and the states, respectively, each in its own
sphere. On this reading, the Court invited each state to devise its
own alternative procedures, while Congress would devise alternative procedures only for federal agents. However, as even Justice
138Contrast RFRA, in which Congress thought that substantial burdens on religion imposed by generally applicable laws were (unconstitutional) harms in themselves.
"I Furthermore, Florida Prepaidmay be less of an obstacle than it at first appears. Notwithstanding the Court's acknowledgment that patents are property for purposes of the
Due Process Clause, in Florida Prepaid as in the other recent Section 5 cases, one senses
that the Court viewed Congress as attempting to evade limits the Court had set. A law
granting remedies for patent infringement is, in some intuitive sense, most clearly an exercise of Congress's Article I powers, see US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8, bearing at best a tangential
relationship to the Civil War Amendments. Having decided (quite erroneously in our view)
that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its power
to enforce the Civil War Amendments but not its Article I powers, see Seminole Tribe, the
FloridaPrepaidCourt was understandably reluctant to permit Congress to treat what looked
like an Article I matter as falling within the Section 5 power. On this view, the Court was
right (within its own erroneous assumptions) to see the Patent Remedy Act as incongruent
with and disproportionate to a Fourteenth Amendment violation, even if the Court-in a
now all too familiar move-chose to explain why in a way that aggrandized its own power
at the expense of Congress.
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Scalia recognized in his Dickerson dissent, through Section 5, the
Constitution grants Congress a "limited power to supplement its
guarantees ... ."" In our view, NACA would satisfy the congruence and proportionality requirement.14 1
B.

COULD CONGRESS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROHIBIT DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS FROM ATTENDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS
OF THEIR CLIENTS?

Suppose Congress determined that videotaping custodial interrogation would solve only half of the problem, and that if states
continued to provide a right to counsel at such interrogations some
otherwise admissible confessions would be lost. We already have
suggested that Congress could bar attorneys in federal cases, but
could it bar them in state cases as well?
Let us imagine that Congress enacts the "National Anti-Coercion
and Effective Custodial Interrogation Act." "NACECIA" requires that all custodial interrogation be preceded by the warning
that a suspect has the right to remain silent and requires that all
custodial interrogation be videotaped. But NACECIA forbids state
agents from delivering the other Miranda warnings and from
allowing attorneys to be present during pre-indictment custodial
interrogation.
Like NACA, NACECIA can only be sustained as an exercise
of the Section 5 power, 142 but viewed from that perspective,
NACECIA is highly problematic. The effect of NACECIA would
be to bar three of the four Miranda warnings and to bar attorneys
"4Dickerson, 120 S Ct at 2345.
other statutes would be authorized under the Court's view of Section 5 remains
an open question. For example, in Zurcher v Stanford Daily, 436 US 547 (1978), the Court
held that neither the First Amendment nor the Fourth Amendment requires any heightened
showing of need by law enforcement in order to obtain a warrant to search a newspaper's
premises for evidence of third-party wrongdoing. Congress responded by enacting the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 USC § 2000aa, which affords the institutional media and
their employees with protection against searches and seizures beyond what the Constitution
(as interpreted in Zurcher) requires. As a regulation of law enforcement officials rather than
the media, the Act may fall outside the scope of the Commerce Clause, and as an apparent
attempt to expand the Court's definition of the substantive right protected by the Fourth
Amendment, the Act may likewise exceed the Section 5 power.
142NACECIA would not pass muster under the Commerce Clause for the same basic
reason that NACA would not: the regulated activity is not economic activity. Both Lopez
and Morrison clearly reject the claim that a law designed to cut crime is, ipso facto, a regulation of interstate commerce.
141What
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from attending custodial interrogation. But if NACECIA reduces
the level of protection to which suspects are entitled, in what sense
is NACECIA an effort to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment?
This looks very much like an attempt to "restrict, abrogate, or
dilute" rights, a power that the Court in Katzenbach v Morgan insisted is not encompassed within Section 5.
Or does it? Section 5 authorizes enforcement measures. If, taken
as a whole, NACECIA works as well as or better than the standard
Miranda warnings, perhaps NACECIA can legitimately be said to
enforce the Fifth Amendment (through the Fourteenth). On this
view, the fact that NACECIA limits the supererogatory measures
states might otherwise employ does not distinguish it from other
federal laws that preempt contrary state practices. Comprehensive
federal statutes routinely block state efforts to "over-enforce" the
very policies that appear to underlie the federal statutes themselves. 143
What about the Court's concern in Morgan about restriction,
abrogation, or dilution? Section 5 gives Congress no power to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, Congress could not,
in the guise of enforcing the Equal Protection Clause, mandate
racial segregation in public schools. That Congress lacks this
power follows both from the fact that Congress lacks a substantive
power to define the Fourteenth Amendment (per Boerne) and,
more fundamentally, from the basic tenets of Marbury v Madison.
But to deny that Congress may authorize rights violations is not
to say that the Section 5 power prevents Congress from eliminating remedies the Court has itself required. In our view, no such
separate limit to Congress's remedial Section 5 power exists. If
some set of procedures is constitutionally required, then of course
Congress cannot dispense with them. But as Miranda shows, the
Court can declare some set of procedures (PI) to be a constitutionally adequate response to some set of risks-a safe harboreven though it would be prepared to uphold some other set of
procedures (P 2). A proponent of NACECIA might thus contend
that Congress should be permitted to conclude that P 2, understood

"ISee, e.g., Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S Ct 2288 (2000) (economic
sanctions for human rights abuses by foreign government); United States v Locke, 120 S Ct
1135 (2000) (oil tanker regulations); City of Burbank v Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 US
624 (1973) (aircraft noise).
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as a comprehensive remedial scheme, is preferable to P. Other
than the ipse dixit in Morgan-which may be best understood as
barring only Congress's power to violate the Constitution-there
is nothing in existing case law to rule out this understanding of
the enforcement power. If it were accepted, NACECIA would fall
within the Section 5 power so long as the NACECIA procedures
themselves are as effective as the Miranda safeguards.
C. THE ANTICOMMANDEERING

PRINCIPLE

Before concluding that Congress can constitutionally enact
NACA (not to mention NACECIA)'" we must consider the doctrine that prohibits Congress from "commandeering" state legislative and executive officials. 145 In another branch of its burgeoning
federalism jurisprudence, the Court held in New York v United
States"4 and Printz v United States147 that Congress may not commandeer the agencies of state government to regulate on behalf
of the federal government. By requiring state officials to videotape
custodial interrogation, NACA appears to "direct the functioning
of the state executive" in violation of Printz.148 If Congress cannot direct state law enforcement officials to perform background
checks on prospective handgun purchasers, as Printz holds, how
can Congress direct state law enforcement officials to videotape
custodial interrogations?
The proper approach appears to come from contrasting Printz
with last Term's unanimous decision in Reno v Condon. 149 In Condon, the Court upheld the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 5 ° notwithstanding the fact that compliance with the Act would "require
time and effort on the part of state employees," 15' because the Act
"'regulated state activities,' rather than 'seeking to control or in144For

simplicity, this section only considers NACA.

141See New York v United States, 505 US 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not
direct the states to enact legislation); Printz v United States, 521 US 898 (1997) (holding
that Congress may not compel state executive officers to carry out federal law).
1- 505 US 144 (1992).

147521 US 898 (1997).
48Id at 932.
149120 S Ct 666 (2000).

15018 USC §§ 2721-25.
"I Reno v Condon, 120 S Ct 666, 672 (2000).

HeinOnline -- 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 97 20002

SHARED CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

99

fluence the manner in which states regulate private parties.' "152
The term "commandeering" implies that rather than doing its own
work, the federal government is attempting to compel the states
to do the federal work. As regulatory objects, by contrast, the states
are subject to, rather than the agents of, a federal regulatory
scheme.
In practice, however, the line between regulation of the states
and impermissible commandeering may be difficult to draw. Both
the background check requirement in Printz and the prohibition
on the release of driver information in Condon take the form of
commands to state actors, and both laws have a substantial regulatory impact on private parties: In Printz the effect is to delay or
deny permission for a seller and purchaser of a handgun to complete their transaction; in Condon the effect is to prevent commercial advertisers and others from obtaining drivers' private information.
One might understand the Printz/Condondistinction in terms of
acts and omissions. The Brady Act forced state officials to take
actions regarding third parties where they might have preferred to
do nothing; the Driver's Privacy Protection Act prohibited the
state from acting with respect to third parties where they would
have preferred to act (by selling driver information to commercial
purchasers). But given all the complex ways in which the modern
state interacts with its citizens, there may nonetheless be doubts
whether the act/omission distinction can do the work that Printz
and Condon seem to require."'
Even if the Printz/Condon distinction is defensible, NACA presents a borderline case. On the one hand, videotaping suspects cannot reasonably be characterized as "regulation" of those suspects.
NACA tells state actors what they must do; it does not tell state
actors what they must tell private parties to do or not to do. Thus,
in terms of Condon, NACA appears unobjectionable. On the other
hand, if the Printz/Condon distinction is an act/omission distinction, NACA seems to fall on the wrong side of the line. It com152Id (quoting South Carolina v Baker, 485 US 505, 514-15 (1988)).
's3 Indeed, the Condon Court itself recognized that the imposition of affirmative obligations on the states is "an inevitable consequence of regulating a state activity." 120 S Ct
at 672 (quoting South Carolina v Baker, 485 US 505, 514 (1988) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). See also Matthew D. Adler and Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:
New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1988 Supreme Court Review 71, 95-102 (1998).
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mands state officials to take an affirmative measure-videotaping
custodial interrogation. We need not resolve this ambiguity, however, because Congress could impose the equivalent of NACA regardless of whether it falls on the Printzor the Condon side of the line.
NACA would be constitutional if Congress phrased it as a substantive rule of law governing confessions. 15 4 The rule would read
something like this: "No statement made during custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the maker of the statement in
a criminal trial in any state or federal court unless the custodial
interrogation was videotaped." This rule would not run afoul of
the anticommandeering principle because so long as a federal law
is within federal competence-as we concluded NACA would be
under the Section 5 power-there is no constitutional obstacle to
15
putting it in the form of a rule that state courts must abide. 1
Long before Miranda, it was settled that state courts could not
utilize evidence obtained in violation of federal law. Thus, the predecessor rule to Miranda, which barred the admission into evidence of involuntary confessions, was routinely invoked to invalidate convictions that rested upon such confessions." 6 Applying
broader substantive understandings, Miranda itself and the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule have the same structure. Further,
the principle is not limited to criminal proceedings. Under New
York Times v Sullivan,'57 a public official can prevail in a defamation
action only by proving the defendant's reckless disregard for the
truth. ' 8 If state law permits recovery on a showing of mere falsehood, Sullivan displaces the state standard.
154 Current doctrine also suggests that Congress could impose NACA as a conditional
exercise of the spending power, see New York, 505 US at 167 (distinguishing commandeering from conditional spending), although it remains to be seen whether this power will
survive the New York/Printz line of cases. Compare Printz, 521 US at 918 ("We of course
do not address [statutes that arguably utilize conditional spending]; it will be time enough
to do so if and when their validity is challenged in a proper case.").
"' We do not contend that there is some general federal power to fashion rules of evidence or procedure for state courts. Our claim is far more limited: If a rule of law falls
within the scope of one of Congress's enumerated powers, requiring state courts to comply
with it is not independently objectionable on federalism grounds.
'See, e.g., Brown v Mississippi, 297 US 278 (1936); Chambers v Florida, 309 US 227
(1940); Ward v Texas, 316 US 547 (1942).
157 376 US 254 (1964).
IS See id at 279-80 (imposing "a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.").
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Nor is the supremacy of federal law in state court limited to
constitutional as opposed to statutory law. Quite apart from the
rule of Testa v Katt, requiring state courts to be open on a nondiscriminatory basis to federal causes of action,159 the availability of
federal law-whatever its source-as a shield against contrary state
action is the very core of federal supremacy.
Thus, in the furtherance of its enumerated powers, Congress
has not hesitated to enact substantive rules that are applicable in
state court. For example, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of
194060 requires state (as well as federal) courts"' to suspend various judicial proceedings by or against active duty members of the
U.S. military. Congress's unquestioned power to provide for the
national defense permits such a rule.
Similarly, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968162 mandates the remedy of exclusion from state
(as well as federal) court proceedings for violations of the substantive terms of the Act, 163 which prohibit some conduct that the
Fourth Amendment would allow. Most prominently, Title III applies to private actors. 64 Although some courts have declined to
165
apply the exclusionary remedy to private violations of the Act,
that approach is not universal. 66 In any event, no court has ever
suggested that an exclusionary remedy for private violations would
be beyond Congress's power. Assuming the substantive provisions
of Title III are authorized under the Commerce Clause or the Section 5 power, a statutory exclusionary rule is unobjectionable.
159330 US 386 (1947). According to the Printz Court, Testa is consistent with the anticommandeering rule because state courts differ from state executives and state legislatures
in two crucial respects. First, the literal language of the Supremacy Clause binds state judges
to federal law. See Printz, 521 US at 928-29. Second, the Madisonian compromise, under
which Congress was free to create no lower federal courts, meant that the Framers contemplated assigning some federal tasks to state court judges. See id at 907. We have doubts
whether these points sufficiently distinguish Testa from New York and Printz, but as we
explain in the text, that is irrelevant to the present discussion, as the validity of a federal
rule of inadmissibility applicable in state court does not rest on the Testa power.
605 USC § App 501 et seq.
16! See 5 USC § App 511(4).
62Pub L No 90-351, 82 Stat 212, codified at 18 USC §§ 2510-22 (1994 & Supp V

1998).
's3 See 18 USC § 2515.
'4See 18 USC § 2511.
165See, e.g., United States v Liddy, 354 F Supp 217 (DDC 1973).
161See, e.g., United States v Grice, 37 F Supp 2d 428 (D S Car 1998) (applying exclusionary
remedy in accordance with the Act's plain language).
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The same is true for NACA. So long as it is authorized by an
affirmative power of Congress, there is no obstacle to Congress
phrasing it as a rule of inadmissibility for the state courts.167
D.

CONGRESSIONAL HUMILITY AND

STATE EXPERIMENTATION

To suggest that Congress could impose NACA (or NACECIA)
on the states is not to suggest that it should do so. Congress should
refrain from imposing such requirements on the states. Congress
should respect the value of experimentation and hesitate to conclude that any one solution is correct.
With regard to NACECIA, the issue is whether states ought to
be free to offer greater protection to individuals than the Constitution requires. There is a long tradition of such freedom, and recent
years have seen an increase in the willingness of state courts to
extend state constitutions beyond the bounds of the federal Constitution.'68 For example, the Supreme Court of Alaska has held "that
an unexcused failure to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a place of detention violates a suspect's right
167NACECIA is a different story, however. There is no plausible way to phrase the attorney ban as an exclusionary rule.
' See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 Harv L Rev 1131 (1999) (positive rights under state constitutions);
Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretationin State ConstitutionalLaw, 84 Va L Rev 389
(1998) (examining justifications for independent state constitutional law); James A. Gardner,
The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich L Rev 761 (1992) (acknowledging
the trend but criticizing its legitimacy). The trend was sparked in part by a plea from Justice
Brennan, see William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protectionof Individual Rights,
90 Harv L Rev 489 (1977), who later applauded state courts' willingness to protect civil
liberties to a greater extent than the U.S. Supreme Court. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardiansof IndividualRights,
61 NYU L Rev 535, 550-52 (1986). See also Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in
Practice and Principle, in 3 Benjamin N. Cardozo Memorial Lectures 1401, 1415 (1995). The
movement has not been all in one direction, however. For example, the Florida Constitution
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures as well as excessive punishments, but
both provisions now contain express limitations that prevent the Florida courts from interpreting them more liberally than the U.S. Supreme Court interprets their federal counterparts. See Fla Const Art I, §§ 12, 17. See also Cal Const Art I, § 24 ("This Constitution
shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than
those afforded by the Constitution of the United States, nor shall it be construed to afford
greater rights to minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal causes than those afforded by
the Constitution of the United States."). As a matter of judicial practice, other states follow
nearly the same course, see Gardner, 90 Mich L Rev at 788-90 (cited above) (discussing
Massachusetts, Virginia, and Louisiana cases). For a defense of this "lockstep" approach,
see Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism,496 Annals Am Acad Pol &
Soc Sci 98, 99 (1988).
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'
The Supreme
to due process, under the Alaska Constitution." 169
Court of Minnesota reached the same conclusion in the exercise
of its supervisory power.' States should be free to extend their
protections for civil liberties beyond those mandated by the federal
Constitution.

III.

THE STATES' INTERPRETIVE ROLE

In Part I we concluded that ACECIA would be constitutional, or at least that some Act of Congress that substitutes one
or more procedures for one or more of the Miranda warnings must
be constitutional. Suppose that a state were to adopt its own version of ACECIA. Would it be valid as well?
A state version of ACECIA plainly would be constitutional.
After all, in Miranda itself, the Court invited "Congress and the
States" to develop alternative safeguards. More important than this
ipse dixit, however, are the premises behind that invitation. In the
Court's view, the Constitution requires an adequate safeguard to
ensure the right to silence and the right to a continuous opportunity to exercise that right. If ACECIA or some other set of procedures satisfies the constitutional standard, it should make no difference whether those procedures are put in place by Congress or
the states.' 1
Perhaps, however, ACECIA's validity rests on a principle of deference to Congress in particular. The Court might conclude that
the Miranda warnings are more effective than the safeguards set
forth in ACECIA, but nonetheless uphold ACECIA out of respect
for Congress's superior ability to find facts. On this view, the
Court might uphold a federal ACECIA but not a state or local
'
ACECIA. "72
"'9 Stephan v State, 711 P2d 1156, 1157 (Alaska 1985). This doctrine is not, strictly speaking, a response to the Miranda Court's invitation to develop alternative safeguards, because
Alaska does not treat videotaping as a substitute for the right to counsel. It treats videotaping
as a wholly additional requirement under Alaska law. See id at 1160.
'70 See State v Scales, 518 NV 2d 587, 592 (1994).
/7 This same logic suggests that localities-including the major metropolitan police
forces most involved in custodial interrogation-also ought to be free to devise their own
alternative safeguards.
If the Court first upheld the federal ACECIA, a question would arise as to whether
...
states, in enacting their own ACECIAs, would be permitted to ride piggy-back on that
judgment. Compare Richmond v J. A. Croson, 488 US 469, 504-06 (1989) (finding Richmond's invocation of Congressional findings with respect to the national market inadequate
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We find this distinction unpersuasive. If Miranda and Dickerson
hold that the Constitution guarantees procedures that are no less
effective than the Miranda warnings, the Court should not approve
procedures that, in its best constitutional judgment, fail to satisfy
that standard. As recent Commerce Clause cases correctly establish, congressional findings can inform the Court's constitutional
judgment; they cannot substitute for it.173 And if Congress can adduce evidence that a federal ACECIA is constitutionally adequate,
there is no reason why a state legislature or even a particular police
department cannot adduce similar evidence in support of a state
or local ACECIA.
More fundamentally, Miranda's invitation was a call for experimentation, and in our system of government, the states and their
'
subdivisions are the quintessential "experimental laboratories."174
Fifty states and thousands of smaller jurisdictions can attempt a
wide variety of approaches without committing the nation as a
whole to a single, potentially inadvisable path.'75 That states and
localities provide an appropriate situs for experimentation seems
especially true with respect to custodial interrogation, because the
vast majority of law enforcement officials are state rather than federal actors.
Prior to the Warren Court's nearly full incorporation of the
criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights against the
states, the Constitution was often interpreted to apply a stricter
standard to the federal government than to the states.'76 In part
to support a local affirmative action program) with id at 546-48 (Marshall dissenting) (arguing that Richmond should have been permitted to rely on Congressional findings).
' See Morrison, 120 S Ct at 1752 ("[T]he existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation."); Lopez,
514 US at 557 n 2 (quoting Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452
US 264, at 311 (1981) (Rehnquist concurring in judgment)) ("Simply because Congress
may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not
necessarily make it so.").
114See New State Ice Co. v Liebmann, 285 US 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting)
("It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country."). See also Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82
Minn L Rev 317, 397-401 (1997); Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 Vand L Rev
1485, 1499 (1994) (arguing that capital and taxpayers act as incentives for local governments
to experiment); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U
Chi L Rev 1484, 1498-1500 (1987) (book review) (exploring economic arguments underlying state innovation).
"' See David L. Shapiro, Federalism: A Dialogue 85-88 (1995).
76See, e.g., Wolfv Colorado, 338 US 25 (1949); Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319 (1937).
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this difference was justified on textual grounds: the open-ended
Due Process Clause was deemed consistent with a wider variety
of procedures than the more detailed guarantees of the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. But the divergence was also based
on principles of federalism. Although jot-for-jot incorporation
means that states no longer have greater freedom than the federal
government to experiment at the core of constitutional guarantees,
the principles of federalism that animated the pre-Warren Court
approach to criminal procedure retain their vitality. It would stand
those principles on their head to say that Congress has a greater
77
power to experiment than the states.'
Having conceded the power of states and their subdivisions to
enact their own versions of ACECIA, we conclude by recasting
observations we have made earlier in other contexts. The Court's
revival of federalism in recent years has met skepticism in some
quarters. The basis for this skepticism is concern about the states'
often appalling use of their constitutional powers to limit individual liberties. Unfortunately, the reaction of state officials to Warren Court initiatives, of which Miranda was no exception, easily
leads one to wonder if federalism's invitation was simply to license
such behavior.
States (and their subdivisions) can and should attempt to operate
within the space of shared constitutional interpretation to innovate
in ways that meet the twin goals of protecting constitutional liberty
and fostering effective governance. These are not always easy goals
177The conclusion that a state ACECIA would be no less valid than a federal ACECIA
may also vindicate our decision to sidestep the debate over the legitimacy of constitutional
common law that envelopes so much academic discussion of Miranda; for that conclusion
illustrates that the term "constitutional common law" is a misnomer when applied to describe the Court's requirement of the Miranda warnings. The term "common law" captures
the idea of judge-made law that is subject to legislative revision. However, at least since
Erie R. Co. v Tompkins, 304 US 64 (1938), it has been understood that common law is the
law of a particular jurisdiction. If constitutional common law were really common law in
this sense, it would clearly be federal common law-in which case it would be revisable
by Congress alone, for state legislatures have no power to create federal law. Yet, as we
have seen, the Miranda warnings should be revisable by the states no less than by Congress.
See Dorf and Sabel, 98 Colum L Rev at 454-55 (cited in note 97).
The term constitutional common law is misleading in a second way as well. True common law can be altered at will by the legislature. If, for example, a state high court recognizes a novel cause of action, the state legislature can wholly abolish that cause of action.
But of course this is exactly what Congress attempted to do through 18 USC § 3501. The
field of maneuver for Congress and the states authorized by Miranda and Dickerson is tightly
circumscribed by the requirement that federal, state, and local law enforcement officials
must observe some set of procedures as effective as the Miranda warnings.

HeinOnline -- 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 104 20002

106

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[2000

to reconcile, and it is undeniable that state officials have in the
past sometimes exercised excessive zeal in their efforts to eliminate
crime. But there are limits under our constitutional system to how
we accomplish these ends, and states therefore ought to respect
fundamental constitutional concerns as well. That is the basis of
sound partnering.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Miranda establishes a constitutional right to procedures that
are adequate to inform a suspect of his right to remain silent in
the face of custodial interrogation and a constitutional right to procedures that provide a continuous opportunity to exercise the right
to remain silent throughout custodial interrogation. Congress or
the states can constitutionally enact substitute procedures for three
of the four Miranda warnings, and arguably a videotaping requirement that dispenses with the right to counsel and the accompanying warnings qualifies as a satisfactory set of substitute procedures.
Notwithstanding the last decade of decisions narrowing the
powers of Congress in favor of the states, Congress could mandate
the videotaping of all custodial interrogation through a rule of inadmissibility applicable in state and federal courts. A federal statute
barring attorneys from custodial interrogation by state officers
might, if combined with the videotaping requirement, fall within
the scope of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, but even if it did, it might nonetheless be invalid as a violation of the anticommandeering rule.
Beyond these considerations of constitutionality lie deeper questions of policy. We do not purport to know whether videotaping or
some other procedure would be an improvement over the Miranda
warnings. Our primary aim has been to set forth the considerations
relevant to allocating authority to decide what constitutes an adequate procedural safeguard.
How should Congress use the authority allocated it? In our
view, even if Congress has the power to bar attorneys from interrogation by state officers, it should not exercise that power. There
is a long tradition of states providing more protection for civil lib-
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erties than the federal Constitution requires.' 78 Congress should
not lightly override that tradition.
A simple videotaping requirement presents a closer question.
Like any uniform national approach, it would stifle experimentation. For that reason, we think that in the first instance Congress
should impose such a requirement only on federal agents. If substantial experience under such a regime proves successful, it might
then appropriately be extended to the states.
This last point has implications for the Court as well. Suppose
experience shows that videotaping leads to fewer confessions that
cause concern and more admissible ones. We put aside the difficult
question of exactly how one measures these effects; let us assume
that videotaping satisfies whatever standard of proof the Court
might demand. 79 If videotaping is shown to be more effective than
the Miranda warnings and no more burdensome to the legitimate
needs of law enforcement, why should the Miranda warnings continue to constitute a safe harbor? In these circumstances, it would
be appropriate for the Court to raise the bar and require videotaping or its equivalent as a constitutional minimum. In this way, the
Court could show respect for the capacity of political actors to
improve upon the Court's own judgment about what satisfies the
constitutional standards it has announced.
178See note 171. The Framers' willingness to rely on state courts to protect individual
rights was reflected in the Madisonian compromise. See note 162; Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
Co. v Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 US 281, 285 (1970) ("Many of the Framers
of the Constitution felt that separate federal courts were unnecessary and that the state
courts could be entrusted to protect both state and federal rights.").
"9 We are also putting aside the question of how a jurisdiction would be able to accumulate sufficient experience to demonstrate the adequacy of a videotaping regime, given that
any procedures other than the standard Mirandawarnings could be subject to an immediate
challenge. For a proposed solution to this problem, see Dorf and Sabel, 98 Colum L Rev
at 462-65 (cited in note 97).
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